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                                        ABSTRACT 
 
This paper deals with an existing question; does market liquidity disequilibrium 
leads to stock market bubble burst? Contemporary research has shown that 
liquidity is the key driving force behind capital market growth and its 
sustenance. Stock markets usually react to changes in market-wide liquidity, 
whose supply-demand cycle fluctuates with investor behavior actions. Market 
illiquidity due to supply shocks or sudden redemption, does exert strain on the 
financial markets as of when if too much untenable, lead to market crash. In this 
paper, we investigate how market-wide fluctuations in liquidity result in return 
volatilities and stock market return asymmetries as also to prove the notion 
whether liquidity per se, is the sole driver of stock market growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we investigate the utility and importance of liquidity as a driving 
force behind stock market growth and return to inquire whether market-wide 
illiquidity cause bubbles to burst. We empirically attempt to measure how 
idiosyncratic changes in market-wide liquidity causes resonance in stock return 
patterns, alongside return volatilities associated with bubbles and crashes. In  
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this endeavor, we try to ascertain the dynamicity of market-wide liquidity 
volatility fluctuations as an effect of investor behavior actions which mediate 
such resonance patterns. We may define financial market actions as;  
 
‘reactions due to collective behavioral actions of groups of investors, 
both experienced and green, whose changing behavioral dynamics 
propend to change in market-wide liquidity in unit time brought 
about by a multitude of trading decisions which drive investment 
outcomes.’ 
 
    If one is to go by the above definition, then one finds that financial market 
reactions are on account of investor behavior heterogeneity; and it is this 
commonality which determines what level of liquidity per unit time exits in a 
particular stock exchange. As also, liquidity factor of an asset per se, a stock or a 
portfolio, influences its very own return variances over a period. This is 
determined by its liquidness, which is in effect, its exchangeable utility function 
into commonness within an undeviating probable juncture, the frequency of 
which is governed by reciprocity of its disposition as a self-determinant of its 
interchangeability. The reciprocity of liquidity’s disposition is not, however, its 
sole determinant whereby, this resend normatively on action dynamics of 
investor groups who seek excess returns from their empowered assets. It is this 
disposition which determine whether assets would be more liquid, or else 
illiquid. In stock markets, if returns correspond to changes in marketcap, the 
intemperance return on liquidity function determines the momentum, direction 
component and the magnitude of aggregate liquidity flow. To state more 
simply, excess returns from a type of assets or stocks attract more liquidity and 
vice versa.1 There is a contention that measuring market wide liquidity betas is 
important for pricing assets.2 Common findings include of the fact that order 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1 See for example, Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh (2003), in Journal of Political Economy. In their paper, 
they have investigated whether cross section of returns is related to stocks’ liquidity betas. According to Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), stocks with higher liquidity earn an average higher return. Well, this contention although 
generally accepted, that least liquidity stocks are in common, less frequently traded than illiquid stocks. However 
without loss of generality, stocks become more attractive to investors on account of new information sets relative to 
its market performances that have broad impact on their returns. Uncertainty on this point still remains.  
 
2 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) differ slightly from Amihud and Mendelson (1986) on the fact that, they find that 
the least liquidity stocks tend to have highest liquidity betas, though stocks with higher liquidity betas possess higher 
systematic risks.  
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 flow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is low. As also, Fama 
observed that returns are on average higher on stocks having high sensitivities to 
liquidity. This brings onto the ramp the liquidity risk factor which accounts to a 
momentum strategy profits. Pricing market wide liquidity has been attempted 
successfully in earlier studies by Pastor and Staumbaugh (2003), and others. 
They have also measured sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate 
liquidity. However, in contrast to their approach, we take a simple yet different 
path to assess the importance of aggregate liquidity fluctuations that cause 
market perturbations. Our model tests independent variables by altering them to 
obtain maximum dependent variations in test results. One of our prime 
objectives is to get best estimate of slope coefficient as a measure of minimum 
ratio of the variance in slope. This is important to ascertain the relationship of 
the slope coefficient to the market responses. It is utterly difficult to ascertain 
probabilities with absolute certainty since, independent variables are known only 
in terms of probability distributions.3 Herein, we have considered taking index 
independent variables in this case; open, high, low and closing price, by 
bypassing a more complex heterogeneity of the Fama French three factor model. 
As also, we did not seek to experiment with combinations of independent 
variables here, and the Fama three factors, that would have in certainty, yielded 
maximum of the dependent variable. This would entail evaluating the function 
in the neighborhood of the maximum, but we content our study to the 
determination of local maxim, which is necessary in this otter. Further, the more 
complex model with most of the market factors as independent variables require 
knowledge and relative importance, as well as characteristics of different 
independent variables, which is of more importance in ‘Factorial Design’. Hence, 
our approach is toward a more superficial exploration of the liquidity 
disposition in effect of fluctuations to determine whether such volatilities induce 
bubbles to crash, indeed. This will further help us to explore the level of 
illiquidity of assets as a determinant of low volume, low trading and crash.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Reader may refer to contemporary classical studies by Wesley Mitchell in one of his most remarkable works, 
Business Cycles, Vol. I and II, NBER publications. It may thus be quite appropriate to draw possible relationship 
between liquidity flow and business cycle variations, since, booms and busts corresponds to fluctuations in the 
parameters of business cycle variables. See the section on discussion for an explanation drawn from classical 
studies of causal-relationship on this subject The reader may wish to refer to several books on this subject matter 
by Wilhelm Rophke in ‘Crisis And Cycles,’, ‘Investment and Business Cycles’, by James W. Angell and in  ‘Some 
International Aspects of the Business Cycle’- by Hans Neisser. 
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II. Background Investigation: 
 
A. Investor Heterodoxy Effect 
 
Contemporary research have established the fact that a sustained deviation from 
equilibrium in fundamentals of asset valuation parameters resulting in price 
appreciation of assets give rise to bubbles.4 Credibility for this stands on the 
behavioral actions of heterogeneous groups of investors as causatum, which we 
refer to investor heterodoxy, and what in-effect, provide liquidity, the most 
important factor behind stock market function and growth, whilst over and 
above, they egregiously contribute to the events of synchronized bubble 
formations and their bursting.  A large and variable amount of literature is 
primarily devoted to the study of, and the causes behind, asymmetric asset 
returns in lieu of asset price volatility. Also, there has been a spurt in generalized 
interests among researchers in the field of empirical finance to investigate and 
formalize the dynamicity of bubble formation and crashes over the time. In this 
paper, we delineate the trajectory of development induced on account of 
investor actions presented as gyrated waves affecting liquidity supply-demand 
cycle variations for organized understanding of return volatility asymmetries, as 
well as the impact of market-wide cyclical liquidity demand-supply formation 
changes. These factors have some resonance effects in models of stock returns.  
 
B. What causes price volatility and bubble burst? 
 
    It is of common knowledge that variations in price responsiveness to changes 
in excess demand and supply leads to evolution of, and then, simultaneous 
bursting of asset price bubbles. Although, bubbles occur primarily due to 
continuous deviation from equilibrium in the fundamentals of the parameters of 
valuation of assets, there are certain other factors that help gesticulation of 
bubbles.4 Dufwenberg and others (2005) have shown that bubbles tend to occur 
with the presence of a few inexperienced traders. Under controlled laboratory  
 
 
 
4 One may refer to Honggang Li and J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. (June 2008), Discrete Dynamics in Nature and 
Society, 2001, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 171-180, where they have studied emergence of volatility dynamics in asset 
markets. 
 
5 See for reference, the paper by Martin Dufwenberg et.al, Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment, The 
American Economic Review Vol.95 Dec 2005 
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experimental setup, they included both experienced as well as inexperienced 
traders and find that, even a presence of a fewer naïve and inexperienced traders 
help sustain a bubble. Various other factors have been implicated as causative 
agents of asset price bubbles. Of these, investors’ behavior actions predominates 
other factors and the widespread participation of these so called ‘noise traders’ 
or technical analysts, who chase trends under speculative frenzy,6 complement to 
volatility and oscillations in the market. It is important to appreciate that 
investors are opportunists in a sense, in which they try to profit from other 
investor’s overvaluation. The overvaluation indicates herein, a particular stock or 
assets has become too much on to value, and this provokes overestimation by 
investors about returns previewed in future from that asset. The demand price 
of assets thus moves up therefore causing an increased demand for liquidity with 
a limited supply of assets. This causes more overconfidence on the part of the 
agents who speculate more superiorly, and superficially, since the fundamental 
values remain imperceptible. Consequently, the fluctuations in the relative belief 
among agents generate more trade whilst the investors are not in accord, and 
these factors precipitously cause sustenance of a bubble arising from discord 
between investor beliefs. 
 
C. Some Historical Account of Bubbles and Crashes: 
 
    Particularly interesting examples provide historical accounts of bubbles; the 
‘Dutch Tulipmania’ of the 1630’s, the ‘South Sea Bubble’, the stock market and 
Real Estate Bubble of Japan in the mid 1980’s the dotcom bubble and lastly, the 
‘New Millennium Bubble’ of the present time.7 This study thus earmarks 
inquisitive analysis to understand volatility of returns associated with the 
bubbles and their return variances during asset price boom-bust cycles. From all 
these événements passes, two things provide a common ground for inquisitive 
interest; one that is, the occurrence of speculative trade in financial assets and 
commodities, which increases the quantity of liquidity available for such trading,  
 
 
 
 
 
6 This speculative frenzy is what we have referred to as redundant sigmoid heterodoxy of the financial markets: the 
investor heterodoxy effect in our previous unpublished work ‘Calculating Stock Market Index Closing Value Using 
Risk Function Curve Equation, Logistic, B-Spline Curve and Polar Conversion techniques’, Chatterjee Sep. 2008. 
Here, we made an effort to quantify investor risk to systematic shock from an entirely different viewpoint. The 
heterodoxy effect refers to too much inclination on abnormal return patterns under speculative frenzy. 
 
7See the seminal work by Garry Gorton, the Subprime Panic of 2008 
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and the other being, the increased demand for liquidity from investors who 
would take part in such events. The intersectional affirmativeness between these 
two factors seems complementary as a consequence of which, it is presupposed 
that bubbles burst. As such, when bubbles do bursts, both speculation and 
liquidity tends to diminish substantially, causing volatility in co-variances of 
returns during the auction-bust cycles in asset prices while the availability of 
market-wide liquidity starts drying up. One such not-so-long, but well-known 
event encircling acute systematic nature of liquidity crisis involved the default of 
the Russian government debt8 in August 1998, which precipitated the failure of  
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and put in distress other fixed-
income relative value hedge funds. This hedge fund took long positions in less 
liquid instruments while went short on more liquid ones. When the debt crisis 
deteriorated market-wide liquidity conditions, LTCM’s liquidity sensitive 
portfolio dropped acutely triggering redemptions to meet margin calls. This is 
perhaps, more highlighted on recent version of global liquidity crisis on account 
of the US mortgage market failure, resulting in a series of correlated defaults 
among financial institutions. These events propend to inter-temporal market 
return asymmetries that can be measured, and our goal is to compute market-
wide liquidity fluctuations which induce these resonance effects. (Dufwenberg 
2005) extensively studied the activities of arbitrageurs which contributes to the 
sustenance and simultaneous bursting of asset bubbles. It shall be noted 
equivocally that, liquidity is an activity function and of commerce to an investor 
like such, during when bubbles burst, market-wide crisis of liquidity take shape 
in the form of liquidity shock, since investor redemptions flush out liquidity 
from the stock markets, while investors approximate further liquidity risks as a 
consequence, trading stretches to diminish.9 Investors at these times are more 
skeptical about their assumptions of spread between liquidity’s marginal utility 
and liquidity risk; rather, they tend to hoard as much as possible as in risk free 
investments until the level of anticipation rises in due time. Dynamicity of 
institutional investor activities likewise contributes to the fluctuations of  
 
 
 
 
8 See Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and Schwartz (2001) and Han (2004) for pricing errors during the LTCM crisis 
during the summer of 1998. 
9 A diagnostic example could be sought for on this subject matter by correlating to the October crash of 1987. 
Grossman and Miller (1988) contend that the market was highly illiquid on October 19, the day of the 1987 
stock market crash. Apart from statistical model based OLS regression test study by Chatterjee July (2009), which 
verified that the rampant volatility that prevailed on the week of the crash, R.J. Shiller (1987) stated there was  no 
major trigger(s) which might have precipitated the crash of 1987, barring some amount of investor over-activity. 
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market-wide liquidity at these times, and a particular paradox is defined; ‘market 
wide liquidity dries up, demand for liquidity is high pressing up on interest 
rates, assets are in abundance supply since there are fewer buyers, and the price 
fundamentals become perceptible as assets become cheaper, and liquidity more 
expensive.’ There occurs random disagreement of beliefs among investors and 
between arbitrageurs ensuing higher volatility, which in turn door upon 
volatility based option traders to take advantage of the volatility, spreads and 
cross-correlations. There has been a wider perception that take shape as of, for 
how much more discounted the assets are to become perceivable, relative to 
liquidity expensiveness.   
 
     Nevertheless, before we van any further, we need to know how illiquidity of 
assets have its influence on stock market returns, that is, to ask whether 
liquidity’s disposition causes markets to crash or bubbles to burst. Since market 
liquidity propels stock market growth, it is undeniably important to categorize 
liquidity according to its functional sources. In the subsequent sections, we shall 
seek to understand the dynamics of liquidity flow, along with its categorizations 
in order to measure market wide liquidity and study the dynamics of cyclical 
variations in liquidity demand-supply model.  Moreover, we will further study 
the asymmetric volatility of the volatile returns associated with bubbles and 
crashes using test statistics with controlled model for error detection, which is 
crucial. 
 
III. The Model 
 
We propose a simple model where we contend our study relative to sudden 
fluctuations in endogenous liquidity escarping the stock markets. We measure 
market-wide liquidity using closing price of a particular index, in this case, the 
DJIA. Previously, Fama measured distribution of market using defined by the 
equation: 
 
                                           E[Ri]=y0+yi ßi                                        eq. ........1 
While computing conditional covariance of market return, the equation is,  
 
                                                               ßi= Cov(Ri, Rm)/Var[Rm]              eq..........2 
[8] 
 
where, Ri return on any asset and Rm is return on market portfolio. In our model, 
we construct a simple equation that measures mean variance in market returns, 
and the ratio of Cov and Var as a measure of market-wide liquidity volatility. The 
equation is given by; 
 
                                      Ri= (Cpm/s+P1/P0)[(1-P1)/(1-P0)]             .............eq.3 
 
Or,                                        	

 

,                     ............eq.4 
 
While solving for return (ri), we derive by combining with likelihood ratio 
    	  	1 	1 
                                                                                               .............eq.5 
Where, Cpm/s is given by the ratio of mean by the standard deviation parameter of 
closing prices over a period of three years. While solving for C, we get 
    	1 	1
, 
Thus,                                                                                    .............eq. 6 
 
                                                C ∈ ℝ or, Cp ∈ ℝi  
This states that, returns congregate in proportion relative to closing prices. To 
this, we need to add the liquidity factor as market cap variable, which is, LMKT, 
which shapes the equation as; 
 
                  log Lmkt/vd=(Lmkt0/LmktCL)/  	

 

,  .........eq. 7 
 
 we formalize the equation further one step to obtain, 
 
                                                    ........eq. 8 
[9] 
 
It is presupposed that market wide liquidity do provide a bases for volatility in 
asset returns.10 In fact, in the light of liquidity diffusion theory, the amount of 
liquidity at a particular unit time is time invariant, which is to say that, the 
quantum state holding banks (or more so, liquidity holding banks) functions 
much on the action behavior dynamics of investors per unit time, as of in similar 
yet analogous to stock markets. 
 
Again by solving for definite integral of L, we get, 
 
" #$%& ' (#$%#   $ %  #)   	  1  1    '#         . … . ,-. 9 
  
 
 as output, we derive; 
 '%%/$0#003& 2////  /3/ 	4	 3/ 	4 / 	1	  	15
	 С 
 
                                                                                                                                   ..........eq. 11 
 While again by partial differentiation on L, we obtain, 10 
 
                              
                                                         ...eq. 12 
 
 
 
 
10 Previously, Pastor and Staumbaugh priced liquidity risk for the purpose of beta estimation for portfolio 
formation using 3 factors of Fama and French (1993). They defined ßi L as the coefficient on Lt regression as 
stated; 
                        
                                          ri,t = ßi 0 +ßi L Lt+ßI M MKTT+ßIS SMBt+ßI H HMLt +7i,v 
 
Where, the independent variable denotes excess returns on marketcap, payoffs on long-short spreads, and book-to-
market ratio. While ri,t  refers to assets i’s excess returns. For more details, see Liquidity Risk, pg 663-664, Journal 
of Political Economy, 2003, Vol. III, no. 3 by Pastor and Staumbaugh.  
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From the above equation, we obtain a dynamic component of liquidity supply-
demand cycle which has a direct relationship to market risk premium that varies 
over time. Our model also considers another characteristic of liquidity 
transmission channel across stock markets, which is, the random component of 
liquidity cycle. We also cross-check whether average returns varies with liquidity 
apportion per unit time. The random component of global liquidity cycle, and 
to some extent, country specific is of particular interest, since, Chari (2003), 
ascertained the importance of capital flows to financial booms and crises. This 
random component may be defined in terms of magnitude of liquidity effusion 
shock from the stock markets. Here, we define two types of shock; slow and fast 
liquidity shocks which may be represented by the equation; 11 
 
                                        L2s 8 9:;-1 9; 8 L2f                   .....eq. 13 
 
    Where, L2s and L2f denote the value of m corresponding to slow and fast 
liquidity shocks respectively. Sub-classifying market wide liquidity shocks of the 
above two types into transverse, continuous and discontinuous shocks; a 
condition admissible to the subtypes of shocks which corresponds to the 
dynamic relations of fluxes in the fast and slow types of liquidity shocks. 
However, it is the investor actions which endogenize the timing of expansion 
and contraction of market wide liquidity conditions. As we mentioned in the 
earlier sections, we will apply test statistics to our model variables, the closing 
prices of DJIA to realize the mechanism of shock transmission and its impact on 
returns. Our model generates test statistic outputs which we correlate to patterns 
of capital flows, or liquidity movements. We perform standard OLS based 
regression analysis on three independent variables of this index, the open, high, 
low and closing prices from which, we derive means and standard deviations,  
and variance-covariance returns, and then employ these values to perform 
likelihood ratio test. The reason for this, we simply propose that, returns can be 
measured by analyzing the changes in closing prices over time series and thus, 
the variations in liquidity supply-demand cycle fluxes relative to changes in 
stocks’ returns, as stated in the equation 6 through 3, where we defined returns 
as a function of; Cp ∈ ℝi. 
 
  
11 This equation is adapted from the chapter, ‘Magnetohydrodynamics shocks, pg.219.  
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Methodology: 
 
We obtain our data on index values of DJIA from Yahoo! Finance and perform 
statistical analysis to derive the index means and standard deviation values over 
the period of 3 years. The tests are performed simultaneously on volume, and all 
the variables of the index. We segregate the three year period data into each 
single year and perform time series analysis over the same period. OLS based 
regression statistic are performed on the index variables to derive the t-statistic 
and the p-value which are significant. The regression equation is given by; 
  
                                                yˆ = b0 + b x1 + b x2+bx3      .......eq.14 
 
  Where, yˆ is the Open, b x1 the high, b x2 low and bx3, the Close respectively. 
P-values derived from the model indicate that the returns flattened during the 
years of 2007 and ’08, while it recovered again 2009 post-crisis. 
 
                
                                                      Fig. 1 
 
 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
A. Market illiquidity due to capital outflow 
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Perhaps every major financial crisis brought about by hurtles in stock markets, 
results in liquidity constraints due to sudden apoptotic behavior of market-wide 
funds, which is in due, effect of, redemption pressures from investors to meet 
margin calls, or outright crashes leading to redemption stampedes. Calvo 
(1998), Chari (2003), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) study the 
herd behavior of investors in their model which states that, investors must move 
in a pre-specified order during stock market clouts. The investors as well as 
business entities weigh the risks involved in their investments further down the 
line in these intangible times concerning future returns on their capital. This 
results in generalized depression among investors who seek shelter in less risky 
investments, and tend to park their remaining liquidity in safer, yet liquid 
instruments, such as, the money markets and gold. The impact flushes out 
money away from the stocks which creates volatility in returns. A sustained 
depressive behavior among investors is what gives rise to market illiquidity, 
under-investment, and return shock which ultimately lead to recession. 
 
B. The 1929 Stock Market Crash and Market Illiquidity 
 
Again, recessions are in general a result of some combined effect of cyclical 
fluctuations and volatility of different processes of business cycles, particularly, 
volatility in industrial activity and output. In associating the causatum of 1929 
crisis as an effect of market illiquidity, it has been implicated that over-saving 
led to the American crisis of 1929. In a sharp contrast however, under-saving 
and over-consumption is thought to have played a significant role in the present 
Sub-prime crisis of this millennium, besides a multitude of other factors that 
precipitated this debacle (Gorton 2008). In establishing the causality of 1929 
great depression, we revisit some historical accounts that specify underlying 
relation between general business conditions and speculation, which led to early 
stock market boom during 1928. Several factors might have precipitated the 
crash. Evidence of overproduction in 1929 and breakdown of the coffee 
valorization stand out against the backdrop of a psychological effect of 
declining grain prices associated with a less favorable crop, and its impact on the 
stock exchange, cannot be overruled. Using statistical series as a safe indicator of 
stock market volatility, we find the existence of investor behavioral indifference 
and the presence of high speculative activities in the early milieu of 1928.     
[13] 
 
Fluctuations in interest rate are also a good indicator of industrial 
overproduction and overcapacity. In effect, the years preceding the crisis 
witnessed prolonged high interest rates that might have depressed business 
activity, although no such exemplary co-relationship exists. Higher call rates 
prevailed as a response to a decline in the supply of credit and current capital, 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963). The year 1932 onwards witnessed deflationary 
declines in world market prices and there occurred currency depreciations of the 
then sterling bloc countries. The first symptom of the crisis took shape in the 
form of declining real estate bond prices which were affected during the great 
crisis. Home ownership and demand for real estate bonds declined during early 
months of 1928 as there caused a sudden diminution of the domestic currency 
reserve. A prevailing higher interest rate scenario also increased the claims on the 
banking system. In fact, the US economy witnessed a rise in consumer credit as 
early as 1928. This has been implicated due to the increase in the velocity of 
money flow with increased rate in the volume of real costs. As also, in 
ascertaining the order of magnitude of speculative profits, this builds sense that 
there occurred rampant speculative trading, since; profits from stock market 
proceedings were reinvested. Evidence also suggests that an increase in net 
displacement resulted in a shift in the income distribution and over-savings. 
Displacement results due to increase in output per worker per hour, as against 
absorption, and gives rise to income distribution disturbances the profit 
proceeds if not, are passed on to wage increment, causes pressure on the wage 
level, whilst, absorption causes a net increase in quantity of output. Statistical 
phenomenon of technological displacement was evident that might have stressed 
wage-price spiral. Moreover, falling prices annihilated profits which resulted in 
lowered real investments below savings that might have contributed to the 
deflationary spiral. Over-saving disturbance has been stated as a hallmark of 
1929 crisis. As also, a sudden change in the profit expectations of the investors 
might have led to the crash of 1929. However, authors debate over whether the 
year of 1929 was characterized by a net absorption or displacement. The theory 
of spending and the structure of expenditure states that whenever corporate 
profit shrinks, corporate investments are deferred. Increase in profits tends to 
increase real investments and causes changes in the patterns of savings. Any act 
of savings means the withdrawal of the purchasing power (liquidity) from the 
market. Hence, a high savings rate produces business depression. As such, 
[14] 
 
business cycle fluctuations are cumulative consequences of over-savings and 
under-investment. The bottom of the matter is, whether over-savings precipitate 
business depression as such. During boom times, corporate profits increases as 
well as investments do. Surplus profits cause investment boom in productive 
capital that increases output and causes market congestion. With oversupply, 
where markets are flooded by goods which cannot be bought, thereby prices 
tend to fall as do corporate profits. With falling corporate profits, business 
entities defer investments and tends to save more, while the costs of deferring 
the projects runs higher than the value of information by waiting (Bernanke 
1980) . Investment is predicted to take place when probable returns over the life 
of the project exceed its costs. This higher savings rate depresses business 
sentiments and further incurs less real investment which ultimately leads to 
generalized depression. The economy began its slow emergence from Depression 
only after the New Deal's rehabilitation of the financial system in 1933—35 
did (Bernanke 1983). Also, during boom times, consumption increases to the 
point that commodities are in short supply that precipitates inflation. The 
general public is often prevented from increasing its consumption beyond 
certain limits as banks put brakes upon consumption by increasing the rate of 
interest. This constrained commodity supply cycle is the prime cause whereby as 
a consequence, outputs cannot be expanded freely during boom times.  
 
C. Relationship between Volatility and Liquidity supply-demand cycle 
 
In the same tune, liquidity constrains have been the hallmark of the present 
crisis of 2008 when the DJIA fell by a more than 51%. Returns on average over 
the previous two years before the crisis struck were in the tune of 5.95% in 
2007 and 12.96% in 2006, from January till December of each year. The 
consumption-real investment-savings cycle started to equilibrate only from the 
month of March ’08 that saw the market on a revival path, although, under 
much speculation. We present the descriptive statistics and OLS output in this 
table below which depicts the mean, standard deviation, t-statistic, p-value of 
the intercept and variance from where, we may compute return stats under 
normal assumptions. From the table below, we find the year 2008 has been 
marked by rampant volatility, as a consequence of liquidity crisis. The mean-to-
std.dev. ratio scores an absolute low of 7.27, indicating high volatility, while, no 
[15] 
 
such market illiquidity can be ascribed to the preceding years. The t-statistic 
ratio for ’08 read a high of -14.26, which is significant. From this analysis, it 
may be empirically, yet inconclusively, presumed that during instances of higher 
volatility, there occurs disequilibrium in liquidity supply-demand cycles.  
 
 
                                                   Table 1 
 
   This topic remains an interesting pursuit for future research. These findings 
prove the notion that volatility induces market-wide liquidity fluctuations, and 
is one of the prime drivers of stock market growth and appreciation, besides, the 
investor action heterogeneities. While, a sustained drop in marketcap 
gesticulates randomness in returns and vacillations in market-wide liquidity, that 
sets in motion speculation among investors as well as an ambience of solicitude, 
trepidation and inter-temporal indecisiveness which depresses general trading 
activities.                                               
 
V. Conclusion 
The history of recessions is as old as the history of trade and business cycles 
itself. Through the ages, gyrations are rendered as cyclical fluctuations in 
national income and commercial output within the generality of trade and 
business tenured through the phases of boom, bust, depression and lastly, 
recovery. In this paper, we have thus formalized in short, the dynamic 
interrelationships between economic activities of consumption, savings and 
investment spending as inherent components of business cycles, in order to 
elucidate the true causes behind the propagation of liquidity shocks due to 
limitations of new real investments that leads to noticeable decline in general 
economic activities, or simply, depressions, and hence, study the patterns of the 
onsets of recessions dotted over a period extending from the beginning of the 
last century till the present times. We have elaborated the events that follow 
dynamic changes in outputs, which tend to adjust the business cycle as a whole.  
Mean Std. Dev. M/S S/M t-ratio p-value Variance
2009 8034.87 562.38 14.28726 0.069992 -8.9 0.9694 316268.4
2008 11244.11 1545.38 7.275952 0.137439 -14.26 0.2688 2388186
2007 13178.26 525.59 25.07327 0.039883 -11.62 0.1893 276249.9
2006 11409.78 494.24 23.08551 0.043317 -11.82 0.4893 244268.9
[16] 
 
In our pursuit, we revisited some quantitative aspects of historical boom-bust 
cycles that clearly marks the events related to the generality of trade cycle 
dynamics. 
 
    Here, we have constructed a simple model to show the nature of relationships 
between market-wide liquidity fluctuations and stock market volatility induced 
by investor behavior action heterogeneities that propend to liquidity shocks, 
which in effect, influence returns on a backdrop set on classical contemporary 
events in the history of business cycles. Also herein, we have elucidated the vista 
encircling occurrence of investor activities which induce fluctuations in market-
wide liquidity that causes disequilibrium in supply-demand cycles. 
 
    Further research on some of the phenomenon correlated to the frontier of 
volatility effects on liquidity flow are called in for some more literal insights 
into these dynamic interrelationships which may, in course of time, bring forth 
new theories related to the subject.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[17] 
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